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Understanding why individuals engage in sport corruption is an emerging topic of 
research. Micro-level accounts of corruption have generally used a single disci-
plinary approach toward understanding why actors commit corruption (e.g., doping 
and match-fixing) in specific sports. The purpose of this study was to first examine 
individual-level explanations of corruption in the context of intercollegiate athletics; 
and, second, to generate an interdisciplinary framework. A multi-case analysis was 
conducted of 20 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) major infractions 
(corruption) reports that occurred between 2005 and 2015. The findings showed 
that actors’ explanations were based on psychological factors—motivations (social 
relationship and self-interest) and personal norms, professional factors (abuse of 
power and failure of responsibilities), and justification factors (rationalizing strate-
gies). This research builds on existing scholarship by generating an interdisciplinary 
framework of micro-level accounts of sport corruption in intercollegiate athletics.
Keywords: causes sport corruption, micro-level accounts, rule violations, interdisci-
plinary corruption framework
The engagement of corrupt acts, by individual sport actors and renegade groups 
is one of the principle threats to the integrity of the sport industry. Causes of corrup-
tion in college sports have been extensively discussed (e.g., Lopiano, 2016; Nixon, 
2014; Yost, 2009; Zimbalist, 2018), yet are under-theorized and limited empirical 
research has examined micro-level (individual) explanations of sport corruption oc-
curring across National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sports. Intercolle-
giate athletic sport corruption ranges from significant/severe breach of conduct and/
or major infractions to incidental issues/breaches of conduct (secondary violations) 
committed by individuals (e.g., athletes, coaches, administrators, staff, faculty, orga-
nizational representatives) and/or referent groups (e.g., coaches, apparel represen-
tatives, agents) (NCAA, 2016). From 2005to 2015, the NCAA reported 126 major/
severe infractions cases that involved three different forms of corruption (i.e., fraud, 
bribery and unethical conduct) and their respective types (e.g., academic, imper-
missible inducements, knowingly influencing others to furnish false or misleading 
information) (NCAA, 2016). Albeit minimal, research on the engagement of inter-
collegiate athletic corruption has focused almost exclusively on meso-level (i.e., 
program and/or institutional) explanations (e.g., university characteristics, and lead-
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ership, conference rivals, pressure to win) in the context of revenue sports (football 
and men’s basketball) (e.g., Clark & Batista, 2009; Fizel & Brown, 2014). However, 
this research does not offer micro-level explanations of the persons (e.g., athletes, 
coaches, administrators, staff or organizational representatives) and their collective 
groups who actually engage in corrupt acts. Given the NCAA’s extensive compliance 
system, research should focus on examining “contextual determinants of corruption 
and interactional processes whereby people come to develop and/or share corrupt-fa-
vorable acts” (Zaloznaya, 2014, p. 193). To contribute to our understanding of fac-
tors that contribute to corrupt behavior, requires more contextually-based research 
on corruption (De Graff, 2009; Pertiwi, 2018), “for which we need a theoretical mod-
el” (De Graff, 2009, p. 42). This research aims to respond to these scholars’ calls by 
examining individuals’ explanations of engaging in corrupt acts within the context 
of intercollegiate sports.  
In the broader sport corruption literature the individual explanations of corrup-
tion have drawn from different academic disciplines including economics, sociology, 
criminology, and psychology where the vast majority has focused on explanations 
within the context of understanding how and why match fixing (e.g., Bag & Saha, 
2011; Hill, 2009a; Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015; Numerato, 2015) and doping oc-
cur (e.g., Bell, Ten Have, & Lauchs, 2016; Engelberg, Moston, & Skinner, 2015). 
Given that the factors contributing to corruption are multifarious (Caiden, Dwivedi, 
& Jabbra, 2001), we would be wrong to assume that individual explanations for 
match fixing and doping are solely responsible for corrupt practices in college sport; 
or that deviance or financial motivations are the central causes of all NCAA corrup-
tion (Cullen, Latessa, & Jonson, 2012). For example, the aforesaid reasons do not 
explain why a faculty member or academic staff person would commit academic 
fraud. In the case of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill academic fraud, 
a department staff member was motivated to assist student-athletes to pass courses 
because of empathy and wanting to help them succeed (Wainstein, Jay, & Kukowski, 
2014).  To accurately depict the range of factors that contribute to NCAA sport actors 
engaging in corrupt behaviours warrants an interdisciplinary investigation to help 
chart its complexity. 
The NCAA provides a rich setting for generating an integrated theoretical 
framework of micro-level explanations for intercollegiate sport actors’ engagement 
in corruption (Humphreys, 2012). First, the NCAA setting affords a local context to 
uncover how group interactions in organizations, peer groups, and sport programs 
affect people’s propensity to abuse the relationships of trust and violate rules. Sec-
ond, the NCAA context permits cross-case analysis that is particularly useful in un-
derstanding the process of corruption (Langseth, 2016), that is, individuals’ courses 
of thoughts and actions leading to corrupt behaviors. Third, NCAA cases allow for 
the examination of individual explanations of corruption across numerous sports 
(e.g., baseball, women’s rowing, volleyball, football, men’s and women’s basket-
ball, men’s and women’s golf), ranges in intensity (i.e., gravity and quantity), and 
hierarchies (i.e. acts and levels of organizational involvement) thus allowing cross 
comparisons of explanations of severity and by different sports. A conglomerate of 
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social, economic, sociological, and psychological factors can be used to explain 
why sport actors engage in intercollegiate corruption and thus the need for contextu-
al-related research that can ultimately yield an interdisciplinary framework (Collins, 
Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009; Gorsira, Denkers, & Huisman, 2016). Last, inter-
collegiate athletics offers a context where the forms and their types of corruption are 
unique to the setting (e.g., academic fraud, impermissible benefits, knowingly influ-
encing others to furnish false information).  The NCAA has a distinct self-monitor-
ing compliance system where the majority of forms and types of corruption are not 
illegal. The findings therefore afford the opportunity for future comparative analysis 
of factors contributing to other sport industry forms and types of corruption (e.g., 
international betting match fixing, host bribery, tanking, salary cap abuses). 
This study seeks to accomplish this aim by examining individual-level explana-
tions of corruption in the context of intercollegiate athletics. The study was guided 
by two research questions: (1) who are the actors engaging in NCAA corruption; and 
(2) what factors influence athletic department stakeholders in deciding to engage in 
NCAA corruption. By conducting a multi-case analysis of individual-level explana-
tions in this NCAA context, the contribution of this work is fourfold. First, it gen-
erates an interdisciplinary framework that includes micro-level factors that explain 
individuals’ decisions to commit corruption within intercollegiate athletics. Second, 
empirical understandings are gained as to why a range of athletic department actors 
engage in corruption. Third, in practice, management strategies are ascertained that 
can address personal and/or micro-level corruption. Fourth, individual-level norms 
that can lead to corruption and, therefore, inform reform efforts become better un-
derstood.  
Defining sport corruption
Across the literature the definition of corruption is a contested concept. To date, 
corruption scholars continue to wrestle with defining and conceptualizing corruption 
(Collins et al., 2009; Masters, 2015) and have yet to accept a universal definition of 
corruption (Langseth, 2016). In the management literature, a broad, rational-choice 
definition of corruption is generally used, that is, the abuse of power for person-
al, subunit, and/or organizational gain (Anand, Ashford, & Joshi, 2004; Zaloznaya, 
2014; Zyglidopoulos, Fleming, & Rothenberg, 2009). A wide array of unethical and 
criminal acts fall under this definition including, fraud, bribery, conflicts of interest, 
embezzlement, and nepotism. Whilst the rational-choice approach to defining cor-
ruption is well accepted in the broader literature and, to some degree, in the sport 
literature, it narrowly assumes that all corruption is “purely instrumental and pre-
meditated” that is, based on maximizing personal and/or group benefits (Zaloznaya, 
2014, p. 190). Zaloznaya (2014) argues that such an assumption that all explanations 
for carrying out corruption are fixed and thus do not warrant further investigation. I 
am arguing that Zaloznaya’s assumption is incorrect because it insinuates that indi-
vidual accounts of corruption should be understood solely on explaining motivations 
for personal gain rather than exploring other factors that individuals’ might take into 
account in deciding to engage in corrupt acts.  Rationalizations and motivations for 
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sport corruption are multiple and influenced by a range of informal norms (e.g., 
loyalty, secrecy) and social contexts (e.g., sport, educational institutions). Thus, a 
definition of sport corruption should incorporate these interactional influences. 
Sport management scholars have also yet to agree on a single, common defi-
nition of corruption that is applicable across contexts within the sport industry 
(Bricknell, 2015; Masters, 2015). Maennig (2005, 2008) provided one of the first 
demarcations of sport corruption by distinguishing competition (e.g., athlete behav-
iors, intentionally not trying to win) and non-competition corruption (e.g., sporting 
officials’ behaviors who neglect their expected positional tasks). Gorse and Chad-
wick (2010) suggested an alternative definition, “involving any illegal, immoral or 
unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest 
for the personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity” (p. 
42). However, both of these definitions fail to capture the scope of corrupt behaviors 
evident in the NCAA. Maennig’s (2005) non-competition definition has some appli-
cability to the NCAA context (officials who neglect positional tasks) but does not 
encompass the range of malfeasance prohibited by the NCAA rules. In addition, his 
competition definition is focused on match manipulation, which is too narrow for an 
intercollegiate setting. Gorse and Chadwick’s (2010) conception is limited to match 
manipulation of sporting contests, which has limited applicability to the range of 
standards of behavior required by NCAA regulations. 
The delivery of NCAA athletics programs operate within higher education. The 
required standard of conduct expected of organizational stakeholders is based on 
“the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model” as stated in the association’s con-
stitution and bylaws (NCAA, 2016, para. 1). NCAA regulations apply to a range 
of stakeholders (e.g., athletes, coaching staff, athletic administrators, support staff, 
institutional administrators and staff, faculty, athletic representatives) and involve a 
wide-reaching standard of behaviors (e.g., institutional control, permissible offers 
and inducements, sportsmanship and ethical conduct, and permissible awards, ben-
efits and expenses) in the administration of athletic departments, sports programs, 
sports rules and competitions, and academic programs. A severe breach of conduct 
(i.e., corrupt act) as defined in the association’s constitution and bylaws is considered 
a major violation and in the revised structure a “level 1 violation” (National Col-
legiate Athletic Association, 2016, para. 1). It is noteworthy that certain standards 
and the different levels of infractions are specific to an intercollegiate setting (e.g., 
academic eligibility, institutional control, amateurism) that create complexities in 
seeking an understanding of individual accounts of rule breaking in a higher ed-
ucation setting. Sport corruption in this study is defined as “acts of appropriation 
and exchange that undermine, subvert, or repudiate the collectively agreed-upon or-
ganizational missions or institutional roles for non-collective ends and purposes” 
(Zaloznaya, 2014, p. 194). Based on the NCAA manual and existing literature (e.g., 
Kihl, Ndiaye, & Fink, 2018), these acts include fraud, defined as “involving some 
form of trickery, swindle or deceit” that can involve “a manipulation or distortion of 
information, facts and expertise” (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001, p. 9). 
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Examples of types of fraud in the NCAA include academic misconduct, imper-
missible financial aid, and impermissible recruiting, tryouts and workouts. Bribery 
refers to either actively offering a bribe or passively receiving a bribe that includes 
such behaviors as offering or receiving improper gifts, peddling privileges, bribery 
to supporting unfair competition, and securing confidential information (Langseth, 
2016, pp. 25–26). Unethical conduct is defined as “a set of guiding principles with 
which each person follows the letter and spirit of the rules” (NCAA, 2018, para. 5). 
Example prohibited behaviors are impeding an investigation, failing to cooperate 
during an investigation, or refusing to provide all relevant or requested information 
during an investigation. 
Zaloznaya’s (2014) definition goes beyond the traditional rational choice defi-
nition of corruption (corruption as abuse of entrusted power for private gain) as it 
is founded in social psychology traditions acknowledging that corruption is context 
determinant and people’s social interactions with rules influence how and why indi-
viduals decide to engage in corruption. Such a definition is the foundation for cre-
ating an interdisciplinary framework that reflects how NCAA actors make sense of 
the rules system and the context influencing factors that guide their decision making. 
This definition also demarcates corrupt behaviors from other forms of organizational 
wrongdoing or misconduct (e.g., bullying, sexual harassment) by emphasizing mis-
appropriation of the association’s mission and guiding principles. 
Literature Review
Moral disengagement 
Moral disengagement theory explains how individuals deactivate their internal 
self-regulatory capabilities (e.g., guilt, shame, and self-condemnation) that typically 
stop them from violating their moral standards. Moral engagement mechanisms dis-
able the self-regulatory processes and as a result, individuals participate in wrong-
doing without feeling personal distress (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bandura, Caprara, & 
Zsolnai, 2000). Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, and Mayer (2011) argued the moral 
disengagement process plays an important role in explaining how individuals are 
able to “engage in corruption without apparent cognitive distress” (p. 4). Athletes 
have used several moral disengagement mechanisms to justify doping including ad-
vantageous comparison (comparing detrimental acts with more harmful ones, and 
making appear less worse), minimizing consequences, and diffusing responsibility 
(Bell et al., 2016; Engelberg et al., 2015; Kirby, Moran, & Guerin, 2011). Athletes 
who doped believed their behavior was not as bad in comparison to athletes commit-
ting serious crimes such as sexual assault or murder (e.g., Engelberg et al., 2015). 
Athletes also justified doping by arguing that minimal health side effects were found 
in using drugs and the immense pressure teammates placed on them to conform 
(Bell et al., 2016; Engelberg et al., 2015; Kirby et al., 2011). Furthermore, Pappa 
and Kenney (2013) reported doping was standard practice in competitive sport, spe-
cifically track and field. Athletes perceived that doping was a common secret that 
went unquestioned, was rationalized as normal, routine, everyone is doing it, and 
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a necessary activity if one wanted to compete at a higher level (Kirby et al., 2011; 
Lentillon-Kaestner & Carstairs, 2010; Pappa & Kenney, 2013). Given the “social 
nature of moral disengagement”, how intercollegiate actors justify corruption and 
the influencing factors “may be quite specific to particular environments” (Boardley 
& Kavussanu, 2011, p. 104). Moral disengagement has yet to be examined in under-
standing individual accounts of corruption in intercollegiate athletics. Intercollegiate 
actors may or may not justify corrupt acts based on advantageous comparison, min-
imizing consequences, and diffusing responsibility. 
Rational choice 
Rational choice theory contends that individuals engage in corruption through cal-
culating the cost versus the benefits and thus make a decision when they believe the 
benefits outweigh the costs (Lastra, Bell, & Bond, in press; Numerato, 2015; Palmer, 
2012). Corruption is, therefore, deemed as an instrumental premeditated action that 
is motivated by maximizing personal benefits at the expense of an organization, or 
public or private goods (Jancsics, 2014).  Rational choice explanations of individuals 
engaging in sport corruption specifically match-fixing, doping, and NCAA corrup-
tion are motivated by goal orientations (achievement/performance and winning) and 
financial gains. 
In the context of match-fixing, gambling-motivated fixing seeks to achieve 
“economic gain indirectly from manipulating field activities for a complete or partial 
result through betting activity” and non-gambling motivated fixes aim to “achieve 
a sporting advantage directly from its result” (KEA, 2012, p. 10).  Players, coach-
es, and officials who fix matches for financial gain  primarily due  to low salaries 
or delayed salaries (Carpenter, 2012; Hill, 2015), duress (Carpenter, 2012; Forrest, 
McHale, & McAuley, 2008; Hill, 2010; Spapens & Olfers, 2015), career advance-
ment (Boeri & Severgnini, 2011), and older players nearing retirement (Hill, 2015). 
Individuals (players/officials) spot fix (a specific aspect of a game, unrelated to the 
final result, is fixed for financial gain) because they experience less guilt and believe 
there is less risk associated with manipulating aspects of a game, therefore, such 
individuals are more prone to agreeing to spot fix (Carpenter, 2012). Furthermore, in 
assessing the risks and benefits, research has shown that individuals in certain coun-
tries (i.e., Greece and Lebanon) generally believe accountability for match-fixing is 
nonexistent because they feel politicians protect corrupt actors (Manoli & Antopou-
los, 2014; Nassif, 2014).
Goal orientation explanations suggest that in the context of doping, athletes dope 
to achieve their high standard goals of performance and winning (Engelberg et al., 
2015; Ehrnborg & Rosén, 2009; Kirby et al., 2011; Pappa & Kennedy, 2013); which 
is arguably a narrow rationale for explaining doping. Over time, athlete motivations 
to dope have evolved where critical incidents lead to more pragmatic factors such 
as injury recovery, time off from sport, a series of poor performances, and to sustain 
participation (Engelberg et al., 2015; Kirby et al., 2011). In comparison, Feustel 
and Rodenberg (2015) found match-fixing was motivated within the promotion/rel-
egation model where asymmetric incentives influence teams seeking promotion (or 
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avoiding relegation), will approach opponents with little incentive to win (or need to 
avoid relegation) to fix a match.
Studies investigating factors contributing to corruption within intercollegiate 
athletics is minimal and has mostly used meso and macro-economic rational mod-
els and/or environment forces (Clark & Batista, 2009) influencing corruption. Fizel 
and Brown’s (2014) economics-based model of the multi-institutional aspects of a 
NCAA major football program found that university characteristics (i.e., Win-Loss 
record and stadium capacity), leadership (coaches tenure), conference rivals, pub-
lic/private university status, and different enforcement regimes were all significant 
influencing factors that lead to corruption. Balsdon, Fong, & Thayer (2007) found 
evidence of ‘‘tanking’’ of games by college basketball teams in conference tourna-
ments to place an additional team in the national tournament, to generate revenue. 
Scholars have also examined environmental forces that lead to NCAA violations. 
Clark and Batista (2009) showed that sports programs at the highest competition 
level—BCS-affiliated conferences—commit more recruiting infractions than in the 
lower competition non-BCS conferences. Whereas, Davis (1999) found major viola-
tions occurred equally in both BCS and non-BCS affiliated programs and violations 
were committed by both revenue and non-revenue sports programs. Rational choice 
approaches to examining NCAA corruption focuses on macro-level analysis that do 
not address why individuals engage in corrupt practices in this context or if similar 
rational choice factors in deciding to dope or engage in match fixing would be ob-
served in NCAA malfeasance.
Relational model: Social networks
Relational approaches concentrate on networks of social relationships (Jancsics, 
2014) in understanding corruption. Individuals form sustainable networks with the 
aim of profiting from the relationship through informal exchanges (Blau, 1964). Two 
types of corrupt network models exist: horizontal networks involving trust-based 
and intimate relationships; and vertical networks comprised of asymmetrical actors 
that use power to influence exchanges. Relationships range from weak to strong. The 
“strength” of an interpersonal tie is based on the frequency of interactions, emotional 
intensity, and intimacy of the relationship (Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs, 1998; Gra-
novetter, 1973). Research shows that social networks are factors that contribute to 
doping (Bell et al., 2016; Pappa & Kenney, 2013). An athlete’s social network con-
tains referent groups that place considerable pressure on athletes to dope (Bell et al., 
2016; Engelberg et al., 2015; Kirby et al., 2011; Paoli & Donati, 2014). An athlete’s 
social network can be comprised of athletes, coaches, doctors, and/or administrators, 
any of whom may rationalize and normalize doping, and/or may apply pressure to 
athletes to conform, perform and/or win, or maintain a code of silence. Bell et al. 
(2016) reported that “[The] Lance Armstrong—UPS Team network inflicted harm 
through methods such as bribery, bullying, and threats of physical assault” (p. 4) to 
ensure athletes conformed. In contrast, Kirby et al. (2011) found athletes felt pres-
sured to dope to gain their teammates’ trust.
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Match-fixing can also be understood in the context of relational models or social 
networks (Hill, 2013; Lee, 2017). Individuals involved in match-fixing activities typ-
ically occur through networks that are “fluid and dynamic social systems that consist 
of patterns of relationships among people and/or actors” (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 
2015, p. 207). Numerato (2015) argued social networks operate in a climate of secre-
cy where match-fixing is normalized and reinforced by a compromising complicity 
of social actors (i.e., players, teams, referees, sport association officials or journal-
ists). Match-fixing in Taiwanese professional baseball was attributed to Confucian 
ideology where the values and symbols of Confucianism have a profound influence 
on an individual’s place in the hierarchy of social and familial relationships (Lee, 
2017).  In this system, Lee (2017) argues that athletes are required to display strict 
obedience, collective harmony, and loyalty to their coaches and thus do not question 
directions to fix matches Hill (2010) argued social mechanisms of strong illegal gam-
bling networks, a high degree of player exploitation, and an expectation of complic-
ity by corrupted officials lead to high levels of corruption. 
Match-fixing social networks can range from highly organized and structured 
global criminal betting syndicates such as found in certain gambling fixes to less 
structured and dyadic in nature observed in locally arranged fixes (Hill, 2013). Glob-
al criminal networks organize around betting syndicates in different national con-
texts where they can influence athletes, coaches, referees, and /or administrators to 
pursue their illegal interests (e.g. Hill, 2010; 2013, 2015). Dyadic and/or less or-
ganized social networks generally occur as a result of either threats or reward by 
club administrators (Manoli & Antopoulos, 2015), coaches (Lee, 2017), or gamblers 
(Hill, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). The motivations behind the rewards or threats are mostly 
financially related where they approach individuals who they believe can be bribed 
and/or intimidated (Hill, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Manoli & Antopoulos, 2014). 
In review, previous research suggests a range of social mechanisms influence 
match-fixing as shown by various case studies of different countries (e.g., Hill, 2010; 
Lee, 2017; Numerato, 2015; Manoli & Antopoulos, 2015). Sports match-fixing in-
volves the cooperation between different actors that range from a simple group to 
a systematic network. Unclear in the sport corruption literature is if different types 
of corruption (e.g., fraud, bribery) carried out by individuals in amateur sport (e.g., 
intercollegiate athletics) involves such social networks to commit malfeasance or an 
understanding of the nature of the networks.
Criminology approach
To date, Cullen et al.’s (2012) research is one of the few studies that have performed 
a micro-level empirical analysis of why intercollegiate athletes’ (football and men’s 
basketball) violated NCAA rules. Framed from criminology theory, they found name-
ly, differential association, propensity, and social control significantly predicted rules 
violations. In particular, both football and basketball athletes were more than like-
ly to engage in malfeasance when they associated with friends who violated rules, 
were highly recruited athletes and/or transfer athletes, and athletes that identified as 
religious fundamentalists. Framing individual-level explanations NCAA violations 
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from a criminology perspective is based on the assumption that NCAA violations 
are crimes. Furthermore, only sampling athletes fails to acknowledge how social 
interactions influenced corrupt behaviors. Ridpath, Gurney, and Snyder’s (2015) ex-
amination of academic fraud in NCAA Division I Men’s basketball and football built 
on Cullen et al. (2012) and found a variety of internal (athletic administrators, staff, 
coaches, student tutors, graduate Assistants) and external (faculty, athletic boosters, 
university administrators) athletic department actors were involved. Thus, showing 
some evidence of the need to understand which sport actors are involved in specific 
forms and types of NCAA corruption. Individual-level explanations of sport corrup-
tion are understudied, especially in NCAA context, where a wide array of sports, 
actors, and forms of corruption exists. Regrettably, we lack an interdisciplinary 
framework that incorporates micro-level factors theorized by different disciplines 
that could explain factors that contribute to corruption within the context of intercol-
legiate athletics. Furthermore, the field is absent of such a framework that is based 
on empirical research, thus further demonstrating the importance of this research.
Methods
A multiple-case sampling technique (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014) was used 
to address the study’s twofold aim of examining individual-level explanations for 
engaging in corruption in NCAA Division I athletics and generating a subsequent 
interdisciplinary framework. Multi-case sampling is a suitable approach to gain an 
in-depth understanding of a phenomenon (Miles et al., 2014; Stake, 1995) and for 
generating theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Examining a range of cases for similarities and 
differences helps gain new knowledge and/or strengthens existing theory (Miles et 
al., 2014); in this context, seeking insights in what ways and reasons NCAA athletic 
department stakeholders commit corruption. Multiple-case sampling also strength-
ens the confidence and overall trustworthiness of the findings through investigating 
how, where, and why phenomena occur across cases (e.g., Miles et al., 2014, Strike, 
1994).
A purposive sampling technique was first employed where instrumental case se-
lection was based on addressing the study’s aim and included the following criteria: 
a) a Division I member category; b) the institution had violated one or more major 
infractions legislation (as defined by the NCAA and corresponded with the study’s 
operational definition of NCAA corruption); c) the availability of gaining access to 
detailed infractions reports; and d) cases that occurred within a 10 year time period 
from 2005-2015. The decade time period was selected to gain a contemporary cross 
analysis of individual-level explanations within NCAA corrupt cases. The NCAA 
does not maintain public records of secondary infractions. Thus, secondary infrac-
tions cases did not meet the inclusion criteria and where not included in the study. 
Based on the purposive sampling criteria, data were collected from the NCAA’s Leg-
islative Services Database (LSDBi) website (NCAA, 2016). The LSDBi contains 
reports on each case of major infractions. Case reports document the actors who 
were involved, the circumstances that lead to the corruption, the types of corruption 
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that occurred, the extent of the corruption, investigative evidence that supported the 
reasons for engaging in corruption, and sanctions. 
During the decade time span, a total of 126 cases of corruption were document-
ed in the LSDBi (NCAA, 2016). From the 126 instrumental cases, a random sample 
(through a random sample generator) of 20 case reports were selected for analysis. A 
multiple case study design reflects replication logic similar to using multiple experi-
ments when seeking to replicate results (Yin, 2014). Rather than adopting a sampling 
logic that seeks a representative sample, Yin (2014) argues that multi-cases aims for 
theoretical replication where selected cases in the aggregate can support the initial 
research proposition. Thus, in relation to this case, replication logic was used for 
selecting the 20 cases to propose an interdisciplinary framework of micro-level ac-
counts of sport corruption in intercollegiate athletics as well as to enhance credibility 
of the study (Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Random 
purposeful sampling is commonly used to promote confidence in accurately record-
ing the phenomena under study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and to ensure “character-
istics of similarity, dissimilarity, redundancy and variety, are sought in order to gain 
greater knowledge of a wider sample” (Stake 1994, p. 240). Miles et al. (2014) also 
assert that the number of cases included in a multiple-case study is  based on a con-
ceptual argument, that is, “the number of cases that provide confidence in the find-
ings, the richness and complexity of the cases, and the feasibility of collecting and 
managing the amount of data” (p. 34). Thus, there are no hard rules on sample size 
but guidelines to use based on the research purpose and context. Patton (2002), in 
particular, argues that the aim of a random sample is “credibility not representative-
ness. A small, purposeful random sample aims to reduce suspicion about why certain 
cases were selected for study” (p. 241). He further argued “the credibility of system-
atic and randomly selected case examples is considerably greater than the personal, 
ad hoc selection of cases ...” (p. 241). Since the reports were secondary data, it was 
also deemed appropriate to randomly select 20 cases in the study (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Patton, 2002). The case reports averaged 22.45 single pages in length, ranged 
from 12-58 pages, and totaled 449 pages of raw data. Bell et al. (2017) maintain that 
case reports are an acceptable data collection method for studying sport corruption 
because of the challenges associated with collecting field data and gaining access to 
participants who actually engaged in malfeasant behavior.
Data analysis was guided by Miles et al.’s (2014) qualitative cross-case data 
analysis process involving first cycle (open coding) and second cycle coding (pattern 
coding) that was carried out by two researchers. First, the 20 major infractions re-
ports were downloaded, read and re-read for familiarity. Codes were then deductive-
ly created from the corruption literature (e.g., Cullen et al., 2012; Engelberg et al., 
2015; Frost & Tischer, 2014; Hill, 2010; Lee, 2017; Numerato, 2015; Peurala, 2013). 
Third, using the qualitative software ATLAS ti. (Scientific Software Development, 
2016) the reports were deductively and inductively openly coded. Open coding is a 
process of tagging data and organizing it into conceptual categories that represented 
who, what, how, and why individuals committed corruption. An example deductive 
code included motivation—financial— meant an individual participated in corrup-
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tion for financial reasons. Inductive open coding was also carried out where in vivo 
codes were created from the reports and respectively tagged.  An example in vivo 
code was rationalization—neutralizing—humanitarian—represented an individual 
justifying committing a violation because he/she wanted to help the welfare of a stu-
dent-athlete. Fourth, pattern coding was then performed to identify common themes 
in terms of understanding how and what factors influenced individuals in their de-
cisions to violate the rules (Miles et al., 2004). Within these two coding process-
es, cross-case analysis was performed to compare and contrast similar and different 
characteristics among the cases in terms of who was involved in the rule violations, 
the events that led up to the violations, and what factors were attributed to their deci-
sions to commit rule violations. Conceptual saturation was achieved as each pattern 
and theme was fully developed (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). The two researchers who 
carried out this open and pattern coding process discussed and sought agreement 
on code development, tagging of the data, and pattern identification. Last, content 
analysis summary tables were created for each case, followed by the generation of a 
meta-analysis matrix where all the data was condensed into one table organized by 
key concepts related to addressing the research questions. 
Findings and Discussion
The findings are organized around two main themes. First, a summary of the multi-
case demographic information. Second, individual-level explanations of athletic de-
partment actors engaging in corruption. The findings are discussed in relation to 
relevant corruption literature, where the contribution of this work is accentuated.  
Multi-case demographics
Table 1 shows a variety of athletic department stakeholders (e.g., athletes, re-
cruited athletes, academic counselors, compliance staff, athletic representatives, and 
coaches’ relatives) were involved in corruption, however, the majority of actors were 
head coaches or assistant coaches. The sports of football (n=10) and men’s basket-
ball (n=9) reported the most violations (see table 2) yet men’s and women’s non-rev-
enue/Olympic sports (i.e., men’s track and field, men’s and women’s cross country, 
men’s and women’s tennis, volleyball, women’s basketball, women’s swimming and 
diving) also reported violations. One case reported corruption in eight sports and one 
reported violations across all sports. Fraud was the most frequent form of corrupt 
act committed by athletic department stakeholders with 30 violation types (e.g., ac-
ademic, impermissible benefits, impermissible financial aid, impermissible contacts, 
and ineligible participants) reported, followed by 13 unethical conduct violations, 
and five bribery violations. Table 2, documents the forms and example types of cor-
rupt activities that occurred in each sport. Within each case analyzed, more than one 
violation was reported.
Critics of intercollegiate athletics have argued that corruption is rife across rev-
enue sports because of rational choice motivations of winning and financial gains 
(e.g., Fizel & Brown, 2014), however, the demographic data showed that corruption 
was prevalent across both revenue and non-revenue/Olympic sports. The motiva-
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tions and pressures to win in relation to job security, salary increases, status/prestige, 
were displayed across all sports. Furthermore, the findings demonstrated the pre-
dominance of fraud and unethical conduct violations were committed by a range of 
athletic department actors. Individual level explanations of NCAA violations have 
focused solely on athlete motivations (Cullen et al., 2012), thus these findings con-
tribute to the literature by demonstrating the scope of individuals involved in NCAA 
violations and the form of corruption committed.
Individual-level explanations of corruption
The findings are organized into three main interrelated themes of individual expla-
nations for engaging in NCAA corruption: 1) psychological motivations (social re-
lationship and self-interest, and personal norms), 2) professional (abuse of power 
and failure of responsibilities), and 3) justifications (rationalizing strategies). The 
respective influencing factors are explained in more detail next.
Table 1. Athletic Department Actors Involved in Major Violation
Actors Violations (n)
Academic Advisor 2
AD 2
Family of Athletic Staff 2
Assistant Coaches 16
Athletic Representative 2
Compliance Assistant 1
Compliance Director 1
Football Support Staff* 6
Head Coach 24
Institution 4
Academics in Institution 2
Promotor 1
Student Workers 1
*External relations, operations, player personnel, program, strength & conditioning, and grad-
uate assistant each were involved in a major violation case.
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Table 2. Sports, Number of Major Violations, Form, and Types
Sports Violations
(n)
Form Types (examples)
All sports 1 Fraud (n=1) Failure to  meet eligibility re-
quirements (n=)
Participation by ineligible SA 
(n=1)
8 sports 1 Fraud (n=1) Impermissible texts and phone 
calls (n=1)
Football 10 Fraud (n=10) Academic (n=2)*
Impermissible extra benefits 
(n=5)
Unethical con-
duct (n=2)
Failed to meet standards of hon-
esty & sportsmanship (n=2)*
Knowingly instructing to furnish 
false/misleading information 
(n=1)
Men’s & women’s 
cross country
1 Fraud (n=1) Impermissible recruiting benefits 
(n=1)* 
Impermissible recruiting contacts 
(n=1)
Men’s & women’s 
swimming & diving
1 Fraud (n=1) Impermissible extra benefits 
(n=1)
Men’s basketball 9 Fraud (n=8) Impermissible tryouts (n=4)* 
Failure to promote compliance 
(n=4)
Impermissible recruiting induce-
ments (n=3)
Academic (n=2)
Bribery (n-2) Impermissible recruiting induce-
ments (n=2)
Unethical con-
duct (n=5)
Failed to meet standards of hon-
esty & sportsmanship (n=3)*
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Men’s tennis 2 Fraud (n=2) Eligibility legislation violations 
(n=1)*
Academic fraud (n=1)
Bribery (n=1) Impermissible extra benefits 
(n=1)
Unethical con-
duct (n=1)
Knowingly arranging impermis-
sible benefits & academic fraud 
(n=1)*  
Knowingly furnishing mislead-
ing information (n=1)
Failed meet standards of honesty 
& sportsmanship (n=1)
Men’s track & field 2 Fraud (n=2) Impermissible recruiting benefits 
(n=1)* 
Impermissible recruiting contacts 
(n=1)
Unethical con-
duct (n=2)
Knowingly involved in recruiting 
violations (n=1)*
Failed meet standards of honesty 
& sportsmanship (n=2)
Volleyball 2 Fraud (n=2) Improper use of correspondence 
courses for academic progress 
(n=1)
Ineligible competition (n=1)
Women’s basketball 4 Fraud (n=4) Impermissible extra benefits  (n=2)
Impermissible tryouts & out of 
season practice activities (n=1)
Bribery (n=1) Impermissible extra benefits (n=1)
Women’s tennis 1 Fraud (n=1) Impermissible recruiting 
benefits (n=1)* impermissible 
recruiting contacts (n=1)
Unethical 
conduct 
(n=1)
Knowingly involved in re-
cruiting violations (n=1)*
Failed meet standards of hon-
esty & sportsmanship (n=1)
*Several types of corruption were reported with one instance but not included in the table
Table 2. Sports, Number of Major Violations, Form, and Types (cont.)
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Psychological: Motivations
Individual motives (i.e., reasons) for engaging in NCAA corruption included social 
relationships and self-interest (winning, competitive advantage, eligibility, and ma-
terial gain). 
Social relationships consisted of horizontal networks (informal personal social 
networks/friendships) and vertical networks (social relationships that involve asym-
metrical power relationships). The NCAA relationships were generally positive (i.e., 
actors were cooperative and/supportive in the relationship) and entered voluntarily, 
which was unlike many of the bribery match-fixing cases where relationships were 
adversarial as crime syndicates engaged in intimidation in relationship development 
and maintenance.  Similar to some match-fixing networks (e.g., Hill, 2009b; Manoli 
& Antonopoulos, 2014; Numerato, 2015), the relationships in this study were mostly 
simple and unsophisticated.  Relationships were deemed simple and unsophisticated 
because: a) the actors were linked by one type of relationship (e.g., professional—
head coach and a high school coach, a spousal relationship, or an assistant coach and 
athletic department representatives) versus multiplex relationships (linked by more 
than one type of relations (e.g., friend, business associate, relative). The simple rela-
tionships were in contrast to the corrupt networks reported by Bell et al (2016) and 
Hill (2013) who found criminal associations (i.e., dark networks) and institutional-
ized network systems comprised of specialists and team members to sustain corrup-
tion. In certain cases the actors were linked through simultaneously by a personal/
intimate relationship and a professional relationship; and b) the network of relation-
ships were relatively small in number (e.g., two-four members). The family and/
or professional links were similar to the Confucian society family system reported 
by Lee (2017). Lee (2017) found social norms influenced friends and family mem-
bers to offer indirect and direct support to “one’s own people” (p. 16). In this study, 
relationships among spouses of coaches of non-revenue sports or coaches and/or 
athletes’ ties with church and cultural community members’ assumedly were a factor 
for the development of simple corrupt networks as they sought to help “family.” 
Recruiting (including recruiting related academic fraud) corrupt behaviors involved 
small network relationships that were secretive and/or lacked surveillance. Opportu-
nities arose for corrupt practices because small network members failed to question 
rule violating behaviors and more than likely their behaviors occurred unobserved. 
Spouses of coaches of non-revenue sports, and church and cultural community mem-
bers’ activities were not under surveillance and thus provided an opportunity for cor-
rupt behavior. Thus, the NCAA’s compliance system seems ineffective in controlling 
these types of family networks corrupt behaviors.
Social relationship strength varied between actors, however, the horizontal na-
ture of the relationship (i.e., personal and professional) was a motivational founda-
tion for committing several different forms of fraud. The strength of a relationship 
is based on a combination of the extent, the emotional intensity, intimacy, and reci-
procity of a connection (Brass et al., 1998; Granovetter, 1973). In this study, the rela-
tionships were generally strong because the ties were direct, involved a person with 
the authority to influence, and the individuals trusted one another. Frequency of in-
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teraction enhances trust and has a positive affect that creates opportunities to engage 
in corruption and offers a payoff (Granovetter, 1973). For example, assistant coaches 
used their preexisting professional relationships or developed relationships with high 
school and club coaches to carryout recruiting fraud (Cases #15 and 16). While a 
staff person involved in a personal relationship with a student-athlete was motivated 
to commit fraud for material—economic gain (Case #2). Other horizontal networks 
between either staff, assistant coaches, and athletic representatives and athletes were 
motivated to commit fraud (impermissible benefits) to help athletes for humanitarian 
justifications (e.g., finding employment, paying for tuition, securing housing, travel, 
government documents, assisting in travel to return home for a family emergency 
(i.e., childbirth or sick parent)) (e.g., Cases # 4, 9, 10). The following representative 
quotations show this relation and the range of humanitarian justification themes:
The former assistant coach characterized his actions on those two occasions as 
humanitarian because prospect 1 (student-athlete) had no other transportation 
available. (Case # 15)
My options, I felt were not the best, but of all the options certainly, I’d 
rather be guilty of an extra benefit violation than have a kid being sent home in 
a box from getting shot at the border. (Case # 9)
The former head coach described his motive as humanitarian, helping the 
family of a prospect in war-torn Serbia. (Case #4)
Athletic department representatives who had strong relationships with international 
student-athletes were also prone to provide impermissible financial support. Despite 
being advised not to financially assist athletes, representatives had paid athlete’s tu-
ition, accommodations, use of credit cards, cash payments, and payment of bills 
(Cases # 4, 10). For example, case #10 documented a representative learning that an 
international student-athlete: 
“had returned from her native country, was enrolled in school, but did not have 
sufficient funds to pay her bills due to additional course work and the necessity 
to pay out-of-state tuition. The representative contacted student-athlete 1 direct-
ly and offered to pay her tuition, an offer the student-athlete accepted.”
The athlete representative rationalized the behavior by arguing that the assistance 
was necessary for successful degree completion because athletic scholarships did 
not pay out of state tuition.  The recruitment of highly skilled international athletes 
provides an opportunity for fraud by assisting student-athletes with impermissible 
accommodations and financial support prior to and during their playing eligibility. 
Many international athletes did not have the financial means to support themselves 
prior to the start of an academic term. Assistant coaches often utilized their horizon-
tal social networks with athlete representatives and their communities (e.g., church 
or cultural) to arrange for support, which often led to these representatives devel-
Individual-Level Explanations of Corruption         59
oping strong relationships with the athletes that continued throughout the athletes’ 
playing eligibility.  
Interpersonal conflict within a horizontal personal relationship also lead to cer-
tain rule breaches in terms of retaliation or a deliberate failure to fulfill responsi-
bilities. For example, staff/assistant coaches’ previous conflict with a superior (i.e., 
head coach or an administrator) weakened vertical relationships between these ac-
tors, which led to subordinate staff persons failing to communicate possible and/or 
report violations. Brass et al. (1998) contend that “lower-level employees feel less 
obligated to monitor or whistle-blow on higher ups” (p. 24). In this study, however, 
interpersonal conflict created poor working relationships between these staff mem-
bers and organizational leaders, and thus staff felt less obliged to approach them 
about their corrupt activities. 
Individual self-interest and/or rational cost/benefit assessment played a role in 
explaining corrupt behavior. Similar to research in understanding match-fixing and 
doping (e.g., Carpenter, 2012; Engelberg et al., 2015; Hill, 2013; Pappa & Kennedy, 
2013), motivations to commit corrupt acts related to some degree of individual or 
a small group benefit. The form of corrupt acts was mainly fraud (e.g., academic, 
impermissible benefits, impermissible contacts) and bribery (e.g., incentives) and 
occurred in both non-revenue and revenue sports. Violations occurred across sport 
programs and all three subdivisions. The motivational benefits generally related to 
the desire to win through gaining a competitive advantage and bribery. For example, 
a head coach sought to gain a competitive advantage through continued bribery of 
a talented tennis student-athlete enticing him “with improper offers of cash, a ve-
hicle and assistance with academic problems” (Case #12). Similarly, several cases 
involved individuals motivated to maintain athlete eligibility by committing fraud 
including academic, impermissible participation of a talented athlete, and impermis-
sible benefits (i.e., paying travel and accommodation expenses for recruits and their 
families). 
Psychological: Personal norms 
Personal norms generally refer to feelings of a “moral obligation to perform or 
refrain from certain actions” (Schwartz & Howard, 1981, p. 191). Personal norms 
are activated through problem awareness (the extent to which someone is aware of 
the adverse consequences of not adhering to the rules) and feeling responsible for the 
respective consequences (Schwartz & Howard, 1981; Steg & Groot, 2010). Actors’ 
moral obligation lapses influenced corrupt acts (i.e., fraud, bribery, and unethical 
conduct) in most cases. The corruption was intentional, planned and carried out, 
and in some instances, despite the advisement against the behavior and awareness 
the action was wrong. Reports stated, for example, “violations were premeditated, 
deliberate or committed after substantial planning … persons of authority condoned, 
participated in or negligently disregarded the violation or related wrongful conduct” 
(Case #14). Deliberate acts of engaging in corruption ranged from academic fraud to 
scheduling impermissible works. For instance, Case #12 reported a former women’s 
tennis head coach had scheduled a work out,
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 activity … and she  went ahead with it even though she had received the compli-
ance director’s reminders and had been advised by the head men’s tennis coach 
(“men’s tennis coach”) before the  activity took place that it was impermissible. 
A common theme across cases was both the influencing factors of individual motives 
(specifically, self-interest) and personal norms (disregard for rules). Kish-Gerphart et 
al (2010) maintain that those who “look out for number one” and/or manipulate oth-
ers for their own personal gain generally make unethical (corrupt) choices at work 
(p. 18). In several cases NCAA sport actors who were motivated by self-interest 
also displayed a flippant disregard for upholding the rules, which was illustrated 
by an athletic department representative stating “she did not care if her actions vi-
olated NCAA rules!” (Case #10). A report summary also specified, “The actions of 
the former head coach, particularly when considered with her other violations set 
forth in this report, reveal an alarming disregard for NCAA rules and student-athlete 
welfare” (case #12). The findings showed that individuals motivated by self-interest 
also lacked problem awareness of the adverse consequences of committing corrupt 
acts (e.g., student-athlete welfare), the importance of integrity, and dismissed their 
ascribed responsibility to abide by the rules. 
Professional: Abuse of power
Ashford and Anand (2003) argued leadership plays a vital role in institutionalizing 
corruption.  Corruption was manifested by institutional leaders abusing their power 
to influence others to participate in corruption or using positional power to break 
norms. Asymmetrical dyadic relationships between powerful head coaches and ath-
letic representatives raised the likelihood that coaches could use their status to pres-
sure them to engage in corrupt practices (e.g., pressure to make a knowingly unautho-
rized donation). Individuals in positions of power (head coaches, assistant coaches, 
academic advisors) also ordered subordinates (assistant coaches, student-athletes, 
graduate students, and undergraduate student workers) to commit varies forms of 
fraud or they directed subordinates and/or prospective student-athletes and/or their 
families to lie about or conceal bribery and/or fraudulent behaviors (e.g., lie about 
impermissible contacts during unofficial visits, academic fraud). Assistant coaches 
were also given directives to “take care of things” or circumvent rules at “the direc-
tion and ultimately insistence of head coaches.” Head coaches “chastised the assis-
tants” if they did not confirm and were placed in a position to “either comply with the 
demands to break the rules or lose his job” (Case #10). The abuse of power contrib-
uted to creating a code of silence (Bell et al., 2016), where subordinates were afraid 
to confront their superiors or report the inappropriate orders in fear of retribution. 
Institutional leaders also concealed corrupt acts to avoid detection and in ex-
treme cases relating to academic fraud head coaches, assistant coaches and/or aca-
demic advisors instructed student-athletes to lie and state they did their own course-
work or a person proctored their tests when this information was false. The following 
quotations illustrates this theme, 
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The assistant football coach repeatedly told student-athletes to lie about the ac-
ademic fraud and about proctor A proctoring the exams” (Case #1). The former 
assistant coach instructed former student-athlete 1 to “deny everything,” includ-
ing the instances of cheating and plagiarism (Case #17). 
Individuals in positions of power authorized corruption where “subordinates as a 
designated role occupant, were expected to execute the authorized acts, and not to 
second guess” (Ashford & Anand, 2003, p. 7) them. The subordinates demonstrated 
a normative duty to comply with these directives despite it opposing their personal 
norms. Noteworthy, actors not formally associated with the organization (i.e., pro-
spective student-athletes and their families) also displayed this normative duty. 
Concealment of corruption as well as aggressive behavior toward investigators 
was also found during NCAA investigations. In most cases individuals in leadership 
positions (e.g., administrators, coaches, general counsel, and compliance officers) 
were advised to refrain from speaking to student-athletes prior to their interview with 
investigators. However, some administrators dismissed the investigators directive 
and compromised the interviews by sharing information with and/or instructing in-
dividuals how to respond to investigators’ questions. For example, Case #16 reported 
“in spite of being instructed by the NCAA investigator not to discuss the matter with 
anyone else, the former head men’s basketball coach made another call to the father 
of prospect 1.” Similarly case #14 conveyed that “the institution, acting contrary to 
the explicit instructions of the AGA staff, had questioned student-athlete 2 on two 
occasions prior to his interview and had disclosed to him specific information, which 
was the subject of the interview.”  The report went to express the combative attitude 
of administrators during investigations.
The former general counsel was not the only person at the institution who con-
veyed a combative attitude toward the investigation. The NCAA agent, gam-
bling and amateurism 
Activities (AGA) investigator assigned to investigate the matter needed su-
pervisory support at some interviews because the attitude of the institution’s 
representatives was so confrontational.
 
The abuse of power through intimidation, in terms of interfering with investigations 
and hostility toward investigators is an important finding. This kind of aggressive be-
havior is strategically used to create feelings of fear, in order to avoid accountability 
and perhaps future investigations. 
Professional: Failure of Responsibility 
Failure to fulfill responsibility referred to employees not carrying out assigned en-
forcement of control mechanisms duties/obligations and was another factor that ex-
plained NCAA violations. Corruption is likely to occur in organizations when the 
“official rules and control systems are not enforced” (Frost & Tischer, 2014, p. 200) 
because of either the difficulty in monitoring and/or laissez-faire approach to com-
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pliance.  In the NCAA context, strict compliance control mechanisms are instituted. 
However, rule violations occurred because individuals neglected their responsibility 
to implement them (e.g., not engaging in rules compliance, not accurately docu-
menting and reporting activities, and not communicating compliance expectations). 
For example, head coaches improperly monitored staff in terms of inspecting docu-
mentation of recruiting practices (e.g., monitoring text messages or phone calls, pro-
spective student-athlete observations and tryouts) or practice activities (e.g., num-
ber of hours, summer workouts). Compliance directors failed to routinely review or 
cross check coaches’ recruiting, practice, and eligibility documentation logs unless 
something “looked suspicious” (Case #11). Failure to enforce control mechanisms 
was also found when organizational leaders (coaches, compliance staff, and athletic 
director) ignored a possible violation, and/or did not report a possible or actual viola-
tion.  A number of cases described that despite leaders possessing “knowledge about 
a potential situation” (e.g., a relationship, fraud) the individual “made no effort to 
interview” the respective parties to determine if a violation had occurred (e.g., Cases 
#4, 10, 11, 13). 
In multiple cases, compliance directors neglected to deliver adequate NCAA 
rules education, which ultimately manifested into institutional actors’ lack of knowl-
edge of the rules and/or a misinterpretation of rules influencing corruption. NCAA 
rules education and understanding the meaning and intent of the rules is a com-
pliance director’s main responsibility, yet numerous instances were reported where 
institutional personnel (coaches, admissions and financial aid staff, compliance staff) 
were unaware of the rules, did not understand the rules (e.g., eligible coaches, imper-
missible benefits, recruiting) and as a result  misinterpreted the rules. The following 
quotation represents this theme, “the head coach had a responsibility to familiarize 
herself with NCAA legislation regarding playing and practice season activities and 
also had an obligation to ask questions of the institution’s athletics compliance of-
ficer regarding the application of NCAA regulations” (Case #7). Respective actors’ 
failures to provide oversight—documentation and reporting—and compliance edu-
cation illustrates the role of power in creating corrupt practices. Leaders dictate the 
behavioral expectations within an organization and enable corrupt practices through 
not suitably educating stakeholders, “enforcing or circumventing rules and controls” 
(Frost & Tischer, 2014, p. 200). 
Justifications: Rationalization
Individual rationalizations justifying corrupt decisions and/or behaviors as accept-
able or the right thing to do was the final theme. Rationalizations involved neutral-
izing strategies where corrupt acts were downplayed, the seriousness minimized, or 
characterized as insignificant. For example, neutralizing strategies used included “if 
a violation occurred, it was only secondary” (Case #12), “my back is turned, I didn’t 
see it” (Case #2), and “the $200 offer for the student-athlete to play through the 
cramps was a “joke”—I didn’t mean it” (#17). Neutralizing justifications for engag-
ing in corrupt acts also involved humanitarian justifications where individuals were 
attempting to promote human welfare such as providing student-athletes impermis-
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sible benefits for travel to visit a sick relative or to be present for a childbirth (e.g., 
Case #12). Several cases involved rationalizing aiding international student-athletes 
such as a “head coach described his motive as humanitarian, helping the family (by 
giving them $6,000) of a prospect in war-torn Serbia” (Case #4). Another case re-
ported a compliance officer weighing the options in deciding whether to provide 
travel for an athlete so he could safely renew his visa. “My options, I felt that was 
the, not the best, but of all the options certainly, again, I’d rather be guilty of an extra 
benefit violation than have a kid being sent home in a box from getting shot at the 
border” (Case #9). Individuals typically do not engage in or perceive themselves as 
corrupt (Ashford & Anand, 2003), through rationalizing ideologies such as down-
playing the magnitude of the act and moral justification of helping people in need 
actors in this study believed they were acting ethically. Bandura et al. (2000, p. 57) 
state “detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying 
it in the service of valued social and moral purposes”. In this study, rationalizations 
were guised under humanitarian causes because for example, “the prospect had no 
other transportation available and he needed a ride to complete a course exam.” 
However, in many of these cases, the underlying motivation was a rational choice to 
promote one’s self-interest (e.g., eligibility).
Summary and Implications
This study aimed at gaining an understanding of factors that contributed to inter-
collegiate athletic actors’ decisions to engage in corruption; and subsequently based 
on the multi-case analysis generate an interdisciplinary framework conceptualizing 
the influencing factors. Figure 1 presents such a framework that included themes 
that represent psychology, economics, and organizational management. To date, no 
empirical study has generated a context specific interdisciplinary framework that 
identified concepts for explaining actors’ decisions to engage in corrupt behavior in 
sport. Zaloznaya’ (2014) definition of corruption underpins the framework—Corrup-
tion is context dependent and individuals’ interactions with the rules system and the 
social environment influence their decisions to commit corruption. The framework 
proposes that intercollegiate athletic actors make sense of the NCAA rules through 
the legislative system where they gain an understanding of normative behavioral ex-
pectations. The decision to engage in corruption is based on three interrelated influ-
encing factors: 1) psychological (motivations (social relationship and self-interest) 
and personal norms), 2) professional (abuse of power and failure of responsibilities), 
and 3) justifications (rationalizing strategies). From a psychological perspective, 
athletic department actors were motivated to break the rules due to different social 
relationships (e.g., personal, professional, and third party) and self interest (desire 
to win, gain a competitive advnatge, material gain, and athlete eligiblity). Personal 
norms influenced actors to engage in corruption as they intentionally disregarded 
upholding the rules. The psychological factors suggest that individuals belonging to 
social networks, whose self-interests are focused on matieral gain and winning, and 
have weak personal norms possess stronger tendancies to act corrupt (Gorsira et al., 
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2016). These psychological factors underlie professional influencing factors of abuse 
of power by using directives, concealment, and intimidation to commit corrupt acts. 
Actors also failed in their professional responsibility as they neglected to monitor, 
investigate, and/or provide rules education. An individual’s  personal norms influ-
ences whether they believe it is acceptable to abuse their power and/or the extent 
that they should carryout their role responsibilities. Lastly, individuals justify cor-
rupt behaviors by rationalizing  (i.e., minimizing and promoting human welfare) the 
behavior as acceptable organizational conduct. Justifications are related  to actors’ 
motivations, personal norms and professional behaviors. Motivations and personal 
norms underpin the nature of actors’ justifications (e.g., minimizing the serious of the 
violation or using humanitarian reasons). Actors’ rule breaking behaviors are moral-
ly justified by arguing the activities were personally and socially acceptable because 
they were minor infrigements and helped people in need. Future research examining 
how rationalizing strategies evolve and become normalized within a group and/or or-
ganization could enhance our understanding of how these potent types of justifying 
behaviors are accepted by intercollegiate actors. 
Given the unique context of intercollegiate athletics, the framework provides 
a starting point that allows for a more suitable assessment of the underlying influ-
encers that lead to corrupt behaviors that may not be relevant in other sport contexts 
(e.g., professional sport or international sport federations). Based on the findings, 
one would be remiss to assume that the examination of malfeasance in intercolle-
giate athletics can appropriately be conducted from a single discipline and/or the-
oretical lens. Future research could explore if additional explanations of sport cor-
ruption exist in different organizational contexts and by integrating interdisciplinary 
perspectives. 
The creation of an interdisciplinary framework of individual-level explanations 
of corruption within intercollegaite athletics distinguished this study from prior sport 
corruption studies (e.g., Cullen et al., 2012; Engelberg et al., 2015; Hill, 2009a ; Lee, 
2017), and in particular in the context of intercollegiate athletics. The multi-case 
analysis showed that three forms of corruption (i.e., fraud, bribery, and unethical 
conduct) and their respective types (e.g., academic fraud, impermissible recruit-
ing inducements, and failure to cooperate) occurred across varying institutions and 
sports. Of note, NCAA corruption was carried out by a wide range of actors, across 
many sports, and not solely by revenue sport coaches and players.  The intercol-
legiate athletic context demonstrated interrelated explanations of engaging in cor-
ruption that has yet to be theorized and/or empirically examined in other sport con-
texts thus highlighting the importance and contribution of generating a theoretical 
framework to assist in analyzing NCAA corruption. For example, department actors 
lacked problem awareness—weak personal norms—that was demonstrated through 
their blatant rule violations, abuse of power, and failure to fulfill their responsibil-
ities.  Intercollegiate athletic actors also used rationalizing and neutralizing tech-
niques related to humanitarian justifications.  Although humanitarian justifications 
mirror Anand et al. (2004) “appealing to higher loyalties” rationalizing technique, 
in the intercollegiate athletic context actors’ altruistic justifications for committing 
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corruption involved both sincere and disingenuous reasons. Intercollegiate athletic 
administrators need to be vigilant and question these weak personal norms and reject 
rationalizing and neutralizing techniques. 
Two main practical implications for intercollegiate athletic leaders are evident. 
First, anti-corruption interventions should incorporate micro-level causes of corrup-
tion within the education and compliance systems. To enhance current compliance 
education and reduce rules violations, it is imperative that administrators understand 
why individuals engage in corruption. As noted, few studies have investigated causes 
of rule violations from a multi-case analysis. This study uncovered a variety of in-
terrelated factors explaining athletic department stakeholders corrupt behaviors be-
yond a cost-benefit analysis. Targeting social relationships, personal norms, abuses 
of power, and rationalizing strategies might assist with compliance rather than past 
practices of increasing regulation, which by and large is the anti-corruption strategy 
of choice. Education and compliance programs should target these root sources of 
corruption, as identified in this study. Gaining insight into the underlying sources of 
corruption is important for improving current compliance programs and practices 
and reducing corrupt behaviors. 
Second, despite the NCAA’s extensive compliance education and enforcement 
practices instituted by member institutions, corruption is a persistent feature. The 
compliance system is based on an integrity model that seeks for members to uphold 
the values of intercollegiate athletics (National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2016) 
in creating and fostering a culture of integrity. While this strategy is commendable, 
it fails to fundamentally address individuals who work within a strong culture and 
receive rules education, yet blatantly disregard the rules and commit corruption. The 
NCAA’s integrity approach to compliance assumes that individuals with weak per-
sonal norms will change their moral values when placed in an organizational culture 
of integrity, which is inconsistently supported in the literature (e.g., Coombs, 1998). 
This begs the question of how can sport organizations keep from hiring individuals 
who possess weak personal norms. Requiring integrity tests (e.g., measurements of 
irresponsibility, carelessness violation of rules) to all applicants is a strategy that 
could assist administrators in preventing hiring individuals who are more than likely 
to engage in corruption (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 
1993).  However, such a strategy requires athletic department leaders possessing the 
moral courage to hire people with integrity and resisting pressure to hire individuals 
who have questionable integrity. 
Limitations
The findings of this study should be considered in light of its limitations, which 
may offer future research opportunities. First, the findings were based on a cross-
case analysis, therefore, conclusions regarding causality cannot not be drawn. The 
strength of multiple-case sampling is adding confidence to the findings through 
examining the range of similar and contrasting cases to establish how, where, and 
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where possible, why a phenomenon occurred (Miles et al., 2014). However, it can-
not be deciphered if all five themes (motivations, personal norms, abuse of power, 
failure of responsibility and rationalization) directly contributed to actors’ decisions 
to engage in rule violations in this study. Experimental research could also test to 
determine the causality of the five factors with corrupt behaviors in intercollegiates. 
Second, although the study examined factors contributing to NCAA sport actors’ 
decisions to engage in corruption, individual roles and responsibilities associated 
with each actor might have also been an influencing factor.  Future research could ex-
amine athletic department actors’ roles and responsibilities to potentially expand on 
the framework of individual-level explanations of NCAA corruption. Third, despite 
the detailed NCAA reports, multiple data sources (e.g., interviews, surveys) could 
have also enhanced the breadth and depth of data collected and expanded on the in-
terdisciplinary framework concepts. Gaining access to this type of data is extremely 
challenging because corrupt actors are either reluctant to participate and/or provide 
accurate information (Bell et al., 2017; Engelberg et al., 2015). 
In conclusion, this study presented a framework outlining individual-level ex-
planations of corruption in the context of intercollegiate athletics where it was ar-
gued that to enhance our understanding of why actors engage in sport corruption 
requires an interdisciplinary approach. The findings contribute to understanding mi-
cro-level causes of sport corruption by showing that psychological and professional 
factors in conjunction with varying justifications contributed to athletic department 
actors engaging in corruption. Sport administrators and leaders should consider these 
individual-level explanations in revised compliance education and reform strategies. 
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